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ACCOUNTING FOR CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
ABROAD: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
Use of the securities laws to regulate foreign bribery entered a new
phase with the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA).I Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) attempted to curtail the flood of questionable payments
made by domestic corporations to foreign governments by requiring disclo-
sure to the investing public of material facts related to those payments. In
contrast, the FCPA adjusts corporate foreign business practices by requir-
ing the establishment of internal corporate accounting controls and
criminalizing certain kinds of questionable payments.
Compliance with the FCPA is difficult as a result of certain ambigui-
ties in the Act's provisions. This problem is further complicated by SEC
enforcement actions which continue to emphasize pre-Act disclosure re-
quirements. This Note first outlines the Act. The Note then discusses and
proposes a solution to the FCPA's ambiguities. Finally, it suggests an en-
forcement scheme that would best effectuate the Act's purposes.
I
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
The FCPA has a double-pronged approach to regulating corporate
misconduct abroad. First, the FCPA requires all corporations under SEC
jurisdiction to adopt and maintain internal accounting controls. 2 Second,
the Act attempts to deter corporations from making questionable payments
by criminalizing such payments rather than requiring their disclosure.3
1. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd,
78fi). Section 102 (the internal accounting controls provision) and § 103 (criminalization of
payments by issuers) amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1976). Section 104 (criminalization of payments by domestic concerns not subject to SEC
jurisdiction) does not become part of the securities law. For a general description of the Act,
see 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 726 (1978). For a discussion of the possible effects and effectiveness of
the FCPA, see Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A4 Unilateral Solution to an
International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227 (1979).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 1979).
3. Id. §§ 78dd-I to 2. For a discussion endorsing the criminalization of questionable
foreign payments, see Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctionsfor Corporate Pay-
ments.Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231 (1977).
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This condemnation of questionable payments and commitment to ensuring
corporate accountability reflect a congressional concern for the public inter-
est in deterring unethical behavior which is unusually broad in the field of
securities regulation.4 Thus the public interest should be carefully consid-
ered in the interpretation and future application of the Act.
A. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Section 102 of the FCPA5 requires all reporting companies to "(A)
make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions" of corporate
assets, and "(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting con-
trols sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" of management authoriza-
tion of transactions involving corporate assets.6 SEC officials stress that
corporate management, not outside auditors or counsel, is responsible for
assessing the weaknesses in existing internal controls and information sys-
tems and bringing these systems into compliance with section 102.7
Unfortunately, what constitutes compliance with section 102 is largely
an unanswered question. There is some concern that the SEC will take
advantage of its rulemaking powers8 to specify standards for records and
4. The primary legislative purpose behind the disclosure provisions, Securities Act of
1933, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (1976); Securities Exchange Act 6f
1934, §§ 12, 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78n (1976), was to insure that adequate information
concerning the financial condition of issuers of securities would be available to the investing
public. See Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acs' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 1222, 1222-25 (1976). Accordingly, the SEC and the courts have limited the SEC's broad
powers to require disclosure to items of economic materiality. The most recent Supreme Court
formulation of materiality is that information is material and must be disclosed "if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important." TSC In-
dus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (proxy statements). Similarly, SEC rules
define as material "those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to
be informed before buying or selling [a] security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1978). Tradi-
tional economic materiality assumes that the average prudent investor or stockholder is inter-
ested only in the profitability of investing in an enterprise. See ADvIsoRY COMM. ON
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., IST Sass., REPORT ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 326-27, 395 (Comm. Print 1977). Since ques-
tionable foreign payments often have little significant impact on the future financial perform-
ance of a corporation, Stevenson, The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAW. 53, 57 (1976),
expansion of traditional definitions of materiality was necessary to compel their disclosure.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Statement by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams to the Financial Execu-
tives Institute 1978 International Convention, summarized in 473 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
D-5 (1978).
8. Ralph C. Ferrara, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the SEC, stated that the
power to "require the maintenance of certain specific books and records" was available before
the passage of the FCPA under § 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78w(a) (1976), which grants general rulemaking authority, and that § 102 strengthened this
FCPA
controls.9 It is unlikely that such specification will occur in the near future,
however, because the SEC assigned the task of developing compliance
guidelines to the accounting profession.10 Furthermore, even if the SEC
does decide that promulgation of rules is necessary to effectuate compliance
with section 102, management's concern that it will be overburdened with
exacting standards is somewhat groundless. The Commission has already
indicated that it will read section 102's "reasonable detail" and "reasonable
assurance" language as simply either a cost/benefit or good faith limitation
power. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (1978). In fact, prior to the enactment of the
FCPA, the SEC had proposed several rules establishing accounting standards. Proposed Rules
13b-l and 13b-2 were incorporated in § 102. The House, however, rejected the inclusion of
Rule 13b-3, prohibiting the falsification of corporate books or records, and Rule 13b-4, prohib-
iting the making of false or misleading statements to an accountant. The Commission had also
proposed that disclosure of management involvement in questionable or illegal payments or
practices be required as Item 6(d) of Schedule 14A. See SEC Release No. 34-13185, 387 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-2 (1977). The SEC has not decided whether to enact all four pro-
posed rules, only 13b-1 and 13b-2 (which would duplicate the FCPA's provisions), or none of
them. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (1978).
9. As one critic stated, almost all corporate conduct is somehow connected with the
broad books and records requirements of § 102. Thus that section could become a "jurisdic-
tional hook" by which the SEC could dictate all aspects of corporate governance. 466 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (1978); see 451 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-5 (1978).
At least two SEC officials have hinted that an enormous expansion of the Commission's
enforcement powers may be another perhaps unintended consequence of § 102. The House
Conference Report on the FCPA and a recent SEC release stated that the Commission's en-
forcement power would extend to "commencing administrative proceedings if appropriate."
H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10; see SEC Release No. 34-14478, 441 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) G-l, G-2 (1978). This statement implies that the SEC could use § 15(c)(4) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976) (the Commission has power to issue orders and
mandate compliance in an administrative proceeding), to order that deficiencies under § 102
be remedied rather than apply for a civil injunction and request ancillary relief from the
courts. In fact, the Commission will "probably ... use the FCPA accounting provisions
where heretofore [it has] used the equitable powers of the court.' Statement by Richard H.
Rowe, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance to the PLI Tenth Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation, in New York, quoted in 479 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 1 (1978).
See 451 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-2 (1978).
10. The Special Advisory Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA) has issued a tenative report on guidelines for compliance with § 102. No
specific standards were suggested because:
The wide range in the size of [the over ten thousand publicly held companies in the
United States], in their operating style, in the complexity of their transactions, in the
diversity of their products and services, and in the geographic dispersion of their oper-
ations clearly makes it impossible to enumerate specific controls ....
SPECIAL ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL, TENTATIVE REPORT, re-
printed in 470 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-l, F-5 (1978). The committee, however, sug-
gested that corporate management assess, evaluate, and monitor compliance with established
accounting control procedures. It also mentioned that management must demand higher ac-
counting standards than an independent auditor. 470 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-1 to 2
(1978). These unilateral, vague recommendations, if not strengthened in future reports, proba-
bly will result in action by the SEC.
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on corporate practices." The most specific SEC announcement to date
states that section 102 "enhances" the importance of internal audit commit-
tees and limits the role of outside auditors to one of oversight.'
2
B. CRIMINALIZATION OF CORRUPT PAYMENTS
Congress chose to criminalize some types of questionable payments
under the FCPA rather than continue the former practice of merely requir-
ing their public disclosure. The primary goal of this change was more effec-
tive deterrence of corporate bribery, but Congress envisioned subsidiary
benefits in the form of easier enforcement. Unlike disclosure requirements,
the proscription of questionable payments tends to be a "self-enforcing,
preventive mechanism." 13
Sections 103 and 104 of the FCPA, 14 which criminalize corrupt pay-
ments, are largely unrelated to section 102.15 These sections make it unlaw-
ful for any "issuer" or "domestic concern," or any agent acting on such an
enterprise's behalf,16 to make, offer, or authorize "corrupt" payments to: (1)
an official of a foreign government, (2) a foreign political party, official, or
candidate, or (3) an individual who the payor knows will give or offer all or
part of the payment to such foreign officials or party.' 7 Such payments, to
be unlawful, must be made with the intent of influencing official action in
order to obtain business.' 8 Willful violations of these sections can result in
fines of up to $1,000,000 for companies and up to $10,000 for individuals, or
11. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (1978). SEC General Counsel Harvey L. Pitt
prefers a good faith standard rather than what he views as the less demanding cost/benefit
standard. Id. However, legislative history indicates that a cost/benefit approach was felt to be
appropriate and both the accounting profession and the SEC have indicated that this is the
proper standard to be applied. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4106; 470 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-2 (1978); 451 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) D-4 (1978).
12. 473 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-6 (1978).
13. S. RP. No. 114, supra note 11, at 10. See H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 6.
14. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to 2 (West Supp. 1979).
15. For discussion of a possible relation between § 102 and § 103, see notes 48.49 infra
and accompanying text.
16. The Senate Report suggested that the determination of whether an employee is acting
on his own behalf or on behalf of the corporation be based on the following criteria: "the
position of the employee, the care with which the board of directors supervises management,
the care with which management supervises employees in sensitive positions and [the corpora-
tion's] adherence to the strict accounting standards set forth under section 102." S. REP. No.
114, supra note 11, at 11. The similarity in outlook between these criteria and the provisions of
§ 102 suggest the relationship between § 103 and § 102.
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (West Supp. 1979).
18. The limitation that the payments must be made in an attempt to retain or obtain busi-
ness has two effects. First, it excludes payments made by company management, employees,
or agents for their own personal benefit. See note 16 supra. Second, it might exclude pay-
ments not directly made to obtain business, for example, payments made to obtain favorable
FCPA
imprisonment for up to five years, or both. 19
Section 103 applies to issuing corporations already subject to SEC ju-
risdiction.20 Because the SEC has access to the records of issuers, and be-
cause it had developed expertise in uncovering foreign bribery prior to the
enactment of the FCPA, the SEC retains investigative jurisdiction under
that section.21 The SEC's enforcement responsibilities under section 103
also include "bringing civil actions, . . . defending lawsuits against the
Commission. . . , and referring cases to the Justice Department for crimi-
nal prosecution where warranted. '22
Section 104 applies to "domestic concerns," defined in the Act as "(A)
any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or
(B) any corporation, partnership, ... or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under
the laws of a State."23 Thus the application of the FCPA extends to compa-
nies that are not required to register and make reports under the securities
laws. The Department of Justice retains full investigative and enforcement
powers under section 104. In addition to having the authority to bring
criminal actions, the Attorney General may institute civil injunctive suits
under this section.24
II
AMBIGUITIES IN THE FCPA
Critics of the FCPA consider it poorly drafted and point to three im-
portant ambiguities. 25 First, what is a "corrupt" practice? Second, assum-
ing a corrupt act, to what degree will corporations be held accountable for
the actions of their agents and subsidiaries? Third, assuming the company
is liable, what sanctions should be imposed: pre-FCPA or FCPA penalties?
tax treatment. SEC officials have stated, however, that they will take an "expansive view" of
the business test. 452 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-4 (1978).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78ff(c), 78dd-2(b) (West Supp. 1979).
20. The criminal penalties of § 103 apply to "any issuer which has a class of securities
registered pursuant to section 781 of this title or which is required to file reports under section
78o(d) of this title." Id. § 78dd-l(a). Subsections 12(a) and (b) of the 1934 Act require an
issuer to register a security to be traded on a national securities exchange with the SEC. 15
U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (b) (1976). Subsection 12(g) requires issuers that have total assets exceeding
$1,000,000 and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more (but less than 750)
persons to register such security. Id. § 781(g). Subsection 15(d) requires an issuer who has
registered an offering under the 1933 Act to file periodic reports. Id. § 78o(d).
21. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
24. Id. § 78dd-2(c).
25. 479 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-9 to 10 (1978).
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These ambiguities, and how they should be resolved to effectuate best the
purposes of the Act, are discussed below.
A. WHAT ARE "CORRUPT" PRACTICES?
The FCPA imposes criminal penalties on companies or individuals
acting on a company's behalf if they willfully26 violate the provisions of
either section 103 (issuers) or section 104 (domestic concerns) by making
payments "corruptly." 27 Although the FCPA does not define "corruptly"
explicitly, the House Report stated that the word is used "to distinguish
between payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free will
in acting [in his official capacity] . ..and those payments which merely
move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do
not involve any discretionary action." 28 Discretionary actions include busi-
ness referrals to the payor, nonperformance of official functions, and legis-
lative or regulatory enactments preferential to the payor.2 9
Nondiscretionary actions are clerical or administrative in nature;30 the most
typical example is facilitation of customs inspections.
The House Report also noted that the word "corruptly" connotes "an
evil' motive or purpose such as that required under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b),
which prohibits domestic bribery."13 1 A survey of payments considered
"corrupt" in cases decided under that section32 indicates that there must be
26. Establishing willfulness has not required proof of intent to violate the law or knowl-
edge that the law was being violated in cases involving the application of securities laws. See
Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1976); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1964).
27. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (West Supp. 1979).
28. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 8. The Report also indicated that the word "cor-
ruptly" does not require that the act be consummated. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Act's exclusion from the definition of foreign official of "any employee of a for-
eign government . . .whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical," 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78dd-l(b), -2(d)(2) (West Supp. 1979), substantiates the view that the FCPA does not
criminalize payments made to influence nondiscretionary acts.
3 1. H.R. REp. No. 640, supra note 9, at 8.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) provides in part:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value
to any public official. . . , or offers or promises any public official ... to give any-
thing of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(I) to influence any official act; or(2) to influence such public official.., to commit or aid in committing,... or
allow, any fraud .... on the United States; or
(3) to induce such public official... to do or omit to do any act in violation of
his lawful duty,..
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.
FCP
some quid pro quo.33 Corrupt intent does not exist if the payment "was
motivated by some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit."'34
The payment, whether it is a discrete transaction or part of a "course of
conduct," must be in exchange for a specific action or a "pattern of official
actions" favorable to the payor.3 5
In sum, "corruptly" has the effect of criminalizing only those payments
that are intended to influence a foreign official in the exercise of his discre-
tionary duties and to be in exchange for a benefit received. Consideration
of four categories of questionable foreign payments-the outright bribe, the
goodwill payment, the "grease" payment, and the coerced payment 36-
demonstrates that the contours of these elements are far from clear.
The outright bribe is the clearest example of a payment proscribed by
the FCPA. Such a payment is typically made to secure a foreign govern-
ment's discretionary grant of various business opportunities. Examples of
such business opportunities include government sales contracts, operating
permits, mineral or petroleum rights, price increases, and product registra-
tions. Most of the payments challenged in enforcement proceedings
brought by the SEC to date, including those not involving the FCPA, fall
into the category of outright bribes. 37 Thus no interpretative problems
should exist in the majority of cases prosecuted under the Act.38
Payments made solely to establish goodwill between a corporation and
a foreign government are not considered "corrupt" under the Act and thus
would not subject the company to FCPA liability. However, if this category
is not construed narrowly when significant payments are involved a massive
loophole will exist. If the payments reflect attempts on the part of a com-
pany to induce even generalized favorable treatment by the foreign govern-
ment, the threshold quid pro quo requirement may well be met. For
example, consider an airline company practice of providing free air travel
for government personnel and their families. This practice may be consid-
33. United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brewster,
506 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
34. United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976).
35. Id.
36. These categories were suggested in Chu & Magraw, The Deductibility of Questionable
Foreign Payments, 87 YALE L.J. 1091, 1091 n.3 (1978), and McLaughlin, The Criminalization ofQuestionable Foreign Payments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1073 n.13 (1978).
37. See, e.g., SEC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978); SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-i (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 30, 1978); SEC v. Boeing Co., 464 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16 (D.D.C. 1978);
SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1978 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978).
38. Interpretative problems may still exist in connection with outright bribes, however, if a
defense of coercion is asserted. See notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text.
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ered "corrupt" depending on: (1) the aggregate value of the airfare, (2) the
prevalence of the practice, and (3) other circumstances, such as whether the
government is currently considering regulations or legislation that may af-
fect the company's foreign activities. If this category is not construed nar-
rowly, companies making such at least colorably corrupt payments could
escape FCPA liability.
The FCPA also clearly excludes from its operation "grease" payments
which are payments that facilitate nondiscretionary actions, such as expe-
diting shipments through customs, placing transatlantic phone calls, secur-
ing required permits, and obtaining adequate police protection.39 Again,
however, what constitutes a grease payment will be a difficult factual ques-
tion in some situations. For example, a payment to a government official
for providing procedural assistance in going through customs or in filing a
tax return may not be a grease payment if it generates an expectation of
special treatment.40 In contrast to factual questions concerning goodwill
payments, close factual situations involving grease payments should be re-
solved in favor of the company. Congress did not intend to deprive compa-
nies of the means to ensure efficient completion of necessary day-to-day
business tasks abroad. By not criminalizing these payments, Congress im-
plicitly recognized that in many foreign countries officials expect as a mat-
ter of course to receive payments before services are performed. This
differentiation makes sense in light of the public interest. The harm to the
public caused by grease payments is much less than that caused by outright
bribes because the former payments merely expedite what would generally
occur anyway. Furthermore, the benefits to companies that stem from al-
lowing such payments are significant. Where the payor is seeking discre-
tionary favoritism, however, the argument for recognizing the expectations
of foreign officials is weaker.
Although the FCPA does not criminalize extortion payments where a
foreign official threatens to inflict physical or personal harm,41 the status of
economically coerced payments is not as clear. The domestic bribery stat-
ute42 apparently does not allow a defense of economic coercion. The Sec-
ond Circuit has held that threats of economic injury made by the recipient
of a questionable payment should be considered only in deciding whether
39. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 11, at 10.
40. At least one commentary has suggested that the FCPA's definition of foreign official,
see note 30 supra, excludes more than just the grease payment. "Clerical" foreign employees
include custom officers and licensers; thus bribes given to them that reduce customs duties or
procure licenses not otherwise available may not be proscribed by the Act. See Chu &
Magraw, supra note 36.
41. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 11, at 11.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
FCPA
the payor had the intent to influence official action.43 A similar approach
should be adopted under the FCPA. Otherwise the assertion of the defense
of economic coercion would become widespread and eviscerate the FCPA's
legislative purpose of prohibiting the giving and, implicitly, the expecting"
of questionable payments.
B. WHEN ARE COMPANIES ACCOUNTABLE?
1. For Their Agents
A major purpose of the FCPA is to encourage companies to take re-
sponsibility for, and try to prevent, the misconduct of persons acting on
their behalf. Violations authorized by management constitute direct corpo-
rate liability. It is likely, however, that there will be no explicit authoriza-
tion for many corrupt payments. Therefore, in many cases, corporate
accountability must be established on the basis of secondary liability.
Secondary liability is imposed on parties who are not direct partici-
pants in a securities violation if they "knowingly and substantially" assist in
the violation, and are "generally aware" of its impropriety.45 Such knowl-
edge can be actual or constructive.46 Constructive knowledge arises from a
breach of the corporation's duty to inquire into corporate activities. 47 Thus
corporations could be held liable for corrupt payments made by their em-
ployees, even though not explicitly authorized, if the payments were made
in circumstances giving rise to a duty of inquiry.
In the case of a domestic concern subject to section 104, the duty to
inquire should be no different from that imposed elsewhere in corporate
law.4 8 The standard governing an issuer's duty to inquire, however, is ar-
guably more stringent because the issuer is also subject to the accounting
provisions of section 102. It is a sensible interpretation of the Act to con-
43. United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. The House Report stated that one purpose of the FCPA was to help U.S. corporations
resist corrupt demands. The Report quoted the Chairman of Gulf Oil Co.: "If we could cite
our law which says we just may not do it, we would be in a better position to resist these
pressures and refuse those requests." H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 5.
45. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974).
46. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d
981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
47. See cases cited in note 46 supra. But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1975) (scienter required for liability under SEC Rule lOb-5).
48. Section 102 does not apply to "domestic concerns" as defined in § 104. While § 102
and § 103 amend the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976), § 104 does not. See
note I supra. Because domestic concerns are generally not as large as issuers, the establish-
ment of internal controls may not be as imperative; in smaller concerns the lack of manage-
ment knowledge and/or authorization of illegal or questionable activities is not as likely to
occur.
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elude that a breach of the provisions of section 102-which were designed
to prevent corporate management from "looking the other way" in regard
to questionable activities--constitutes a breach of the duty of inquiry.49
Thus a section 103 company should be liable for a corrupt payment made
by an employee if compliance with section 102's "reasonable detail" and
"accurately and fairly" standards would require the payment to be recorded
in company books. In other words, the corporation should be held to have
actual knowledge of all transactions recorded in company books and con-
structive knowledge of all transactions that should be reported under sec-
tion 102.
This interpretation will not give rise to strict liability for corporations.
If every corrupt payment made but not reported were considered a breach
of section 102, a corporation would be liable for every corrupt payment
made. But such strict liability will not result in fact because the accounting
provisions are not expected to catch all corrupt payments, only those that
would be recorded if the books were kept in reasonable detail.
2. For Their Foreign Subsidiaries
The FCPA does not criminalize corrupt payments made by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The House version of the bill defined
"domestic concern" in section 104 to be "any corporation ... which is
owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United
States, which has its principal place of business in the United States, or
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States."' 50 The
committee reporting on the bill felt it "appropriate to extend the coverage
of the bill to non-U.S. based subsidiaries because of the extensive use of
such entities as a conduit for questionable or improper foreign payments
authorized by their domestic parent." 51 The bill as ultimately enacted,
however, did not define "domestic concern" to include U.S.-controlled for-
eign subsidiaries.52 The Conference Report explained the exclusion of such
foreign subsidiaries from the Act's coverage by citing the "inherent jurisdic-
tional, enforcement, and diplomatic" difficulties that would otherwise re-
sult.53 The Conference Committee did not feel, however, that this
exclusion would create a loophole in the Act since any citizen, national, or
49. See note 16 supra.
50. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 11-12 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). The extraterritorial application of federal criminal law
was said to be supported by at least three established principles of international law: territori-
ality, nationality, and the domestic effects doctrine. Id. at 12 n.3.
52. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
53. H. CONF. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEws 4121, 4126.
FCPA
resident of the United States or any foreign national or resident otherwise
under the jurisdiction of the United States would be subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion for engaging in bribery indirectly through a foreign subsidiary.5 4
There are at least three situations in which a parent company indirectly
bribes a foreign official by using a foreign subsidiary as a conduit. First, if a
domestic corporation has actual knowledge of an unlawful practice and if it
authorizes or substantially assists such practice, criminal penalties should
be imposed on the parent corporation as an aider or abettor. Examples of
authorization of illegal practices of a subsidiary by a parent company are
not uncommon.
55
Second, where no actual knowledge or authorization can be proved,
parent companies should be charged in appropriate cases with constructive
knowledge. For example, unusually large cash disbursements by foreign
subsidiaries should give rise to a duty of inquiry. In cases involving rela-
tively small questionable payments occasionally made by employees of a
foreign subsidiary out of the subsidiary's operating budget, or where off-
the-book accounts are kept, no such duty of inquiry should necessarily
arise.5 6 Thus, if a single foreign subsidiary uses fictitious invoices to with-
draw $1,500,000 within a two year period to pay foreign government agen-
cies for sales contracts, constructive knowledge should be imposed. On the
other hand, if seven different subsidiaries in different countries make pay-
ments to foreign government officials totaling $900,000, the case for con-
structive knowledge may not be as clear.57
A third situation in which a parent corporation could be held liable for
its subsidiary's foreign activities is that in which a principal-agent relation-
ship exists. A subsidiary is not ordinarily considered the agent of the parent
company merely because a majority of its voting shares are held by the
parent.5 8 In some cases, however, a subsidiary is considered the agent of its
parent, as for example, when it enters into a contract on the parent's ac-
54. Id.
55. In disclosures made pursuant to the Voluntary Compliance Program, see notes 65-68
infra and accompanying text, Exxon reported that some questionable payments made by its
Italian subsidiary in order to secure oil sales contracts were either known or authorized by the
corporation's directors and management. Similar disclosures were made by General Tele-
phone Electronics Corp., Cities Service, and Gulf. SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND IL-
LEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTIcEs, exhibit A (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as SEC REPORT].
56. Thus the test for determining whether a corporation has constructive knowledge of its
subsidiary's activities is not as strict as that used when the questionable activities are those of a
domestic agent. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
57. These hypotheticals are based on disclosures made by the Burroughs Corp. and John-
son & Johnson. SEC REPORT, supra note 55.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M (1957).
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count.5 9 If a foreign subsidiary is the agent of the parent corporation, the
parent would be liable for all questionable payments made by the subsidi-
ary in the exercise of its agency authority.60 In some cases, even though a
subsidiary is not technically an agent, the parent is held liable for the ac-
tions of its subsidiary. This view is commonly referred to as "piercing the
corporate veil": the separate corporate existence of the subsidiary is disre-
garded because it is so dominated by the parent as to be only its instru-
ment.61 If, therefore, a foreign subsidiary's activities are substantially
under the control of the parent corporation, the parent corporation would
be chargeable with the subsidiary's wrongs. An example of such a situation
would be the use of a foreign subsidiary to "launder" money eventually
used for the payment of foreign bribes.
C. WHAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED?
The FCPA has not significantly changed the SEC's "basic enforcement
program" in the area of foreign bribery.62 Actions instituted against corpo-
rations making questionable foreign payments have emphasized violations
of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 193463
rather than FCPA charges. 64 This enforcement scheme differs little from
that adopted in the now defunct Voluntary Compliance Program.65 That
59. A true agency relationship was found in National Plumbing Supply Co. v. Torretti,
237 Mo. App. 570, 175 S.W.2d 947 (1943). Essentially all the shares of both the parent and
subsidiary were owned by the same person. The expenses of the subsidiary were sometimes
paid by the parent. When the subsidiary did pay its own expenses, it was immediately reim-
bursed by the parent. Furthermore, the parent company had told a third party that it would
pay all of the subsidiary's bills. Another case of a subsidiary agent is Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit
& Vegetable Serv., Inc., 224 N.C. 628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944), in which the parent and subsidiary
had common employees with whom a third party dealt. Shipments sent to the parent by the
third party were paid for by either the subsidiary or parent.
60. The FCPA specifically provides that a corporation is liable for the corrupt payments
made by an agent acting on the corporation's behalf. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (West
Supp. 1979). Therefore, actions undertaken for the personal enrichment of the foreign subsidi-
ary agent would not subject the parent to FCPA liability.
61. The Reporter's Notes to § 14M of the Restatement (Second) of Agency explicate the
difference between a true principal-agent relationship and relationships where the separate
corporate entity of the subsidiary is disregarded for policy reasons. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 14M, Reporter's Notes (1957).
62. 466 SEC. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) A-4 (1978). The Department of Justice has been
equally cautious in implementing the FCPA. Id.
63. See, e.g., SEC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978); SEC v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 477 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) A-1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1978); SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
A-1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1978); SEC v. Boeing, 464 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16 (D.D.C.
1978); SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1978 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978).
64. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-4 (1978).
65. The SEC instituted the Voluntary Compliance Program in 1976. The purpose of the
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program required corporations to make disclosure of all material facts re-
lating to foreign payments. Difficulties arose in complying with the pro-
gram, however, because the standards for disclosure it endorsed departed
from traditional concepts of financial materiality.66 In addition, because it
did not require that the names of the foreign countries and parties involved
in the questionable transactions be disclosed, the effectiveness of the pro-
gram in preventing foreign bribes was questioned. 67 The program was
ended apparently because of this latter criticism. 6 8
Congress in enacting the FCPA recognized that criminalizing foreign
payments would be more of a deterrent to foreign bribery than disclosure.
Furthermore, it sought to avoid the administrative burdens necessarily in-
volved in liberal disclosure requirements.69 Thus the lack of FCPA prose-
cutions by the SEC is unwarranted except to the extent that it avoids
retroactive application of a criminal statute.
The optimal approach to implementing the FCPA in light of the dis-
closure requirements of the securities laws would recognize and balance the
interests sought to be protected by each. By criminalizing foreign corrupt
practices, Congress wanted to ensure that the public interest in conducting
foreign business transactions in an ethical and competitively healthy man-
ner would not be overlooked by profit-motivated corporations. 70 The dis-
closure requirements, on the other hand, were designed to protect the
economic interests of the investing public.7 1 Deterrence of foreign bribery
is not necessarily beneficial to investors; disclosure of financially significant
payments is.
An optimal balance would require all financially significant foreign
payments to be disclosed. For example, payments to customs officials made
on a regular basis, although not covered under the Act, might still be a
Program was to encourage corporations to disclose questionable payments voluntarily and
thus ease the investigative burden of the SEC. Statement by SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills
before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Comm., reported in [1975-1976 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,364 (Jan.
14, 1976); see SEC REPORT, supra note 55, at 8-11.
66. Henderson & Sommer, Sensitive Corporate Payments: The SEC'S Voluntary Disclosure
Program, in EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 423, 442-43 (1977).
67. SEC REPORT, supra note 55, at 32-33.
68. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Miscon-
duct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. Rav. 1099, 1255 (1977).
69. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 6; S. REP. No. 114, supra note 11, at 10. See note
13 supra and accompanying text.
70. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 4-5 (foreign bribery "rewards corruption instead of
efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards"); S. REP. No. 114,
supra note 11, at 4 (foreign bribery affects domestic competition by acting as a "substitute for
healthy competition").
71. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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material fact required to be disclosed to the investing public. The same
argument could also support disclosure of goodwill payments constituting a
financially significant expenditure of corporate funds.72 On the other hand,
only payments that are truly egregious and violative of public policy would
be subject to the severe criminal sanctions of the FCPA. Of course, some
payments will be subject to both the disclosure requirements and the crimi-
nal sanctions of the FCPA. For example, a $2,000,000 payment to a foreign
official who then awards a government contract is both a bribe, violative of
the FCPA, and a payment significant enough to require disclosure. There
is, of course, no reason to demand exclusivity, since no double penalization
occurs; failure to disclose material facts results in the entry of a civil consent
decree, not criminal penalties.
In addition, as suggested by the House Report 73 and the SEC,74 a pri-
vate right of action should be available to all those injured by violations of
the FCPA.75 A private right of action can be implied "in favor of the in-
tended beneficiaries of a statute where necessary to implement the statute's
underlying purposes." 76 To implement the FCPA's policies, a private right
of action should extend to the general public, as well as to shareholders.77
The liability to which corporations would be exposed would not be cata-
strophic since, as the General Counsel for the SEC stated, a "lack of pecu-
niary harm will be the real impediment to such actions."78 Violations of
section 102, the internal accounting controls provision, will probably only
injure shareholders. Violations of sections 103 and 104, on the other hand,
would very probably result in economic loss to business competitors.
CONCLUSION
The FCPA encourages corporate accountability in two ways: by re-
quiring the establishment of internal accounting controls and by criminaliz-
72. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
73. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 9, at 10.
74. Opinion of Office of the General Counsel on the Existence of a Private Right of Action
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, [1978 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) IT 81,701.
75. But see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in which the Supreme Court allowed a private
right of action only when four factors are present. (1) The plaintiff must be "one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." (2) There must be "legislative intent...
to create such a remedy." (3) The remedy must be "consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme." (4) The cause of action must not be "one traditionally relegated to
state law." Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
76. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
77. Opinion of General Counsel, supra note 74.
78. 452 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (1978).
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ing questionable payments made in particular circumstances. This
approach ensures that the public interest in ethical foreign business transac-
tions will not be circumvented by self-serving corporations. The pre-Act
materiality doctrine, however, is still viable and should continue to require
disclosure of financially relevant information to the investing public. In
general, to solve the problems of FCPA interpretation, one must consider
the policies of the Act and balance them against the potential burdens to the
corporation.
Jennifer L. Miller

